

the moment when Jerusalem was concerned with matters of security, Washington officials evidently had not caught up in the political fixation of the accord to worry about it.

Clearly the tension between the two sides could only be eased if each made concessions to the other's main concern. And, late last week, that was exactly what happened. Washington reluctantly assured Jerusalem that it would provide the sophisticated equipment that the Israelis would need to offset the Soviet missiles—mainly the Shrike air-to-air missile and its Wild Weasel counterpart. (The two devices, when fitted to the built Phantom jets already in the hands, combine to search out and destroy the radar of a SAM battery.) As part, Israel formally notified the UN mediator Gunnar Jarring that it was ready to begin negotiations with Egypt and Jordan on a peace settlement—and that it was prepared to discuss the arrangements for the cease-fire.

Israeli move opened the way for the three sides to call representatives of the three sides together—perhaps as soon as the end of this week. Although the tacit understanding refused to disclose his plans, there were indications that the initial talks would take place, as the Arabs in the relative anonymity of New York said that they would be conducted in the U.N. ambassadors' rather than by Foreign Ministers, as the Israelis would like. Cairo has already named Mohammed H. el-Zayyat, its U.N. representative, as its chief negotiator. In a television interview last week, el-Zayyat affirmed that Egypt would participate in the peace talks with "great interest and with hopes."

Other developments in the Arab world underscored the obstacles that lie in the way of a cease-fire and a lasting peace in the Middle East. Despite the carefulness of the U.S. statement on the violations, Cairo responded to the suggestion of American monitoring of the cease-fire zone as a "pretext for espionage." Although surprised at the move, the Egyptians in Washington regarded it mainly as a tactical ploy, and they insisted that surveillance flights would continue. Both sides are going to be very active in the negotiations," explained one official. "If we accuse the Egyptians of espionage, they are going to deny the charge. But I don't for a minute believe they will try to shoot down a U-2." **And to Negotiate:** Despite the talk about surveillance, the Egyptians are clearly bracing for diplomatic negotiations. Late last week, Jordan's King Hussein flew to Cairo for a third round of meetings with President Abdel Nasser. The two leaders privately discussed their bargaining positions and mapped out contingency plans for use if the talks collapse. The most important item on their agenda was the problem of the Palestinian

EYES IN THE SKY OVER THE SUEZ

One day early last week, a spidery U-2 reconnaissance plane landed at a small airfield on the island of Crete in the Eastern Mediterranean. The pilot, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, carefully taxied his black-painted craft to a remote corner of the field, outrigger wheels holding the plane's long, floppy wings off the ground. The U-2 has been an infrequent visitor to the Middle East in recent years, for it was outclassed long ago by the faster, more agile SR-71 photo plane. But now that the shooting has stopped along the Suez Canal, the U-2 is no longer vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, and the reliable, cheaply operated spy plane has found a place in the array of space-age gadgetry that is now being used to police the fragile cease-fire in the Middle East.

U-2 flights make up a large part of the American surveillance program in the cease-fire zone. Soaring aloft at 70,000 feet, the plane makes a daily reconnaissance run along the Israeli-held edge of the Suez Canal. In one sweep, according to Pentagon intelligence experts, the oblique cameras mounted on the plane provide good coverage for some 25 miles on each side. "The U-2 photos are damn good," says one well-informed American official. "They aren't as good as some enthusiasts claim—you can't read the name on a golf ball at 70,000 feet—but you can tell the difference between an Oldsmobile and a Cadillac, and that's all we need."


Impressive: More to the point, the pictures are so sharp that analysts can distinguish between Soviet SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles, or between real and dummy installations. The photos produced by "spy-in-the-sky" satellites are equally impressive. Launched into polar orbit about 100 miles up, an updated version of the old Samos spy satellites photographs the entire globe as it revolves below. Every few days, the capsule ejects a film pack, which can be caught in midair by a plane or picked up from the surface of the Pacific by a warship. "We can get excellent photographs of any part of the world in a matter of days," says a Pentagon officer. "The only hitch is that we have to wait for the cameras to pass over the area we are interested in, and then we have to hope that there are no clouds and that the overflight occurs in daytime."

Unlike the Americans, Israel depends almost exclusively on airplane reconnaissance missions for its information on the deployment of Russian missiles across the canal. French-made Mirage photo planes, flying at upwards of 50,000 feet, record activity as far as 20 miles beyond the Suez. Israeli intelligence is augmented by land-based electronic listening devices capable of monitoring distant radar emissions and radio communica-


tions. But for all its sophistication, most experts believe that this equipment—designed originally for jamming radar during offensive raids—will be difficult to adapt to the job of policing the cease-fire.

On the Arab side, Russian pilots and photographic satellites provide Egypt with virtually all of its reconnaissance information. The Soviets have launched some eighteen Cosmos space capsules from their Plesetsk launch center near Archangel this year—including one high-resolution camera system the day before the cease-fire began. And Russian pilots stationed in Egypt and flying converted bombers have no doubt photographed the Israeli side of the truce line. But although the Soviets and their clients would probably like to know more about the location of Israeli Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, airfields and other bases, they do not share Israel's urgent concern over cease-fire violations. Unlike the Israelis, the Arabs have little reason to fear that their opponents will take advantage of the 90-day truce to prepare for a large-scale ground attack across the canal.

The ubiquitous eyes in the sky were a major factor in the establishment of a Middle East cease-fire on Aug. 7; given the deep suspicion on both sides, the truce would probably be unworkable without reconnaissance planes and satellites. But what electronics has joined together, it can also put asunder. For if the surveillance equipment should continue to discover violations of the cease-fire—or even raise suspicions of a violation—the guns of the Middle East could soon be roaring once again.



Israeli photos: Aug. 7 excavations



Aug. 16: Completed missile battery